Middle Nation Book Discussion:The Crusades Through Arab Eyes | Session 9

I just wanted to point out something that really stands out to me is, early on as we discussed, Nur ad Dinizinki, his, his PR campaign is is we're talking about it. His propaganda, I think, is how the author puts it. But really how I perceive it is just very astute realpolitik as we talked about. And it just reminds me that look at that time, he looked at who are the, for lack of a better term, the the people that have sway, the people that need to be convinced. And we will note that it was not the rulers, it was the advisers to the rulers, it was the orima, it was the common people.

So he asserted and applied pressure upon those people, and that's why you have that sort of sort of tongue in cheek almost complaint of that ruler that by the time he asked for us to join jihad, I had no no choice but to comply. And this is it's not about does this seem right, does this seem wrong, what is a better approach. It's just about it's not about principles. It's about realism. Right?

So this is what worked. This is not very different from how in this day and age as we talk about the real power players, the power and the influence lies with a national OCGFC, for example, and so the pressure is applied in that regard. And so when we see leaders here sort of applying pressure and making moves and making deals, it's not different. It's the same principle. It's just applied where the pressure will actually matter.

And hence why we have, like, you know, okay. This sort of peace plan in us, this sort of reconstruction thing here. How do we situate ourselves, position ourselves, and signal that, hey. These are the players that we can apply pressure to so that when the moves need to be made, there isn't any any sort of the wheels have been greased appropriately. And in that similar vein is how you mentioned that he could sort of gave reprieve to some of the leaders like, hey.

Look. You can just go to this area so that the leaders didn't feel like, hey. If he comes in, our life has has ended. And I think this is not dissimilar to I think on principle, we can get up in arms about it, but not very dissimilar to how some people that we we don't like very much. But we trust their affair with with Allah that we want to see some things happen to them.

But if what's needed is for them to just be sidelined so that they're no longer causing havoc or in positions where they can assert undue influence, then So I think that's just something that stood out to me, and I just really appreciated seeing that being applied in that context so many this a century ago and then some well, just about a century ago, And and seeing how even in our context, almost a 100 years later, you can see the same principle be applied, but it just has to be contextualized to what is the the influence points in our time.

Yeah. Absolutely. I mean, Nourid Din Mahmud was a generous man, and this is a trait that actually Sohrad Din Ayyubi would inherit. Like, as long as you don't or as long as you're onboard or as as long as you are onboard with my plan for the region, you will gain. You're not you're not going to lose.

Right? So this is a point that both Muir Dimmun and Salahaddin Ayubi tried to made very clear that you will not going you are not going to lose by being, under my nominal overlordship. All I need is that you support me when I wage war against the French. So this meant that they were trying to actually consolidate. We can see that now after a millennium from from the incidents, from the from the events.

But not the first ruler to have to have had doubts was was, of course, he didn't know the intentions of the two men. But after after after that, it it it became easier for rulers to really trust the word of nor did Muhammad or Why? Because they were true to their words. They remain true to their words. Just trust trust my my promise to you that I won't, you know, I won't take away your city or your troops as long as you help me in my war against the French.

And, yeah, regarding the that's exactly like he he we see that yeah. He was able to conduct to send messages with Damascus and not Avak. We're talking about the the elements in the army who were on board. The head of the defense militia was on board. So he knew that those people were the people who had the strongest influence, on the Damas schemes.

And when Udi Imam had those elements in his camp, he was able to take the city, peacefully and without any blood being spilled. Yes, sister Samir?

Assalamu alaikum. Can you hear

me? So

I will just reiterate what I mentioned before in the chat. Since we are talking about Imad Din and the difference between Imad Din and his son. As I said before, Imad Din well, now in retrospect, we can say he was the founder of a dynasty of the Dzinji Dzinji. And, you know, when he first came in, he inherited an undisciplined army. So and that required precisely the kind of leadership that he showed.

He needed to be rigid. He needed to be authoritarian. He needed to discipline an army that was not disciplined. So and so he you know, so that he can be able to effectively fight whoever was challenging him. But then by the next generation which is Notre Deens, at that time, it was a different challenge, especially when we as he explained what happened in Damascus where what is needed is not really that hard disciplinarian like his father, but what is needed is a softer, you know, skill in persuasion, in PR, in public image, you know, so that he can win the popular support over the the the people over.

So he can win hearts, basically, the people's hearts. So but but, of course, reading this, both of them, like, recognizing what is needed at their time in their own generation is what really makes them, you know, the protagonists, both of them, Imadidine and Nur ad Din, of their own time. Like, I cannot judge Imadidine based on Nur ad Din's condition, like his condition was different, Imadidine's time was different. And so what unite but what united both of them is despite, you know, their different styles, it's just they have a, you know, a strategic vision. They had a vision, which is to unify the forces and, you know, to confront the French.

And so if that is their vision, then they had to do whatever is needed. So they have to read the the time, they have to read the context in which they are living, and be that be that character that is needed for their own time. I think, that is how I see it, and I really love this part of the of the book, trying to contrast between Imad Din and, and Nur ad Din. And then later on, so inshallah, Salahad Din's time, which is going to be also another different context in which Egypt imagine in Egypt, a completely different context which needs a different, set of character and, you know, tactics that, makes, Salahdin stand out, maybe from, Nur ad Din. But ultimately, each generation, Imad Din, Nur ad Din, and Salahdin, Subhanallah, it's like as if they were meant for their time exactly, but the time needed and they were absolutely really amazing when I read their their history.

That's all I wanted to say.

Between Nur ad Din Mahmud's time and Ahmadine Zakist time. Like, for example, one of the biggest differences is that by the time of Nur ad Din Mahmud, Onur was dead. Tortugin and Onur were dead. This meant that Damascus was deprived of a strong leadership. Right?

So this meant that he, Nouridimahun, didn't really have the same exact set of conditions that faced Emirid Dinzing. That could be an argument that can be made and it's a very sound argument. It's just that Ahmadine Zinke may be because, again, the background of Ahmadine Zinke also is a bit different than Ahmadine Zinke's because Ahmadine Zinke's father was killed, as we mentioned, in a very brutal power struggle over Aleppo by Tutush, the brother of Malik Shah. So Ahmadine Zinke was actually living in a very, in a very rough neighbourhood. Right?

And it was, you know, eat or be eaten. So his upbringing was was not the kind of upbringing that Nur ad Din Mahmoud lived in, for example. And I think that affected the personality of the two men. Right? And Mehdi Gienzinke was was orphaned at a very young age, not 10 years of old, not 10 years of age.

And his father was a close friend to the the subject court, to Malik Shai, and he died in the power struggle. Emile Dizenki grew up thinking that I have to be a strong man, a terrorizing man, or not a terrorizing man, but a strong man who will force submission onto his foes. Nuhdi Mahmoud grew up in a somewhat different environment. Right? His father was there until he was 30 years of age.

He felt that his father was a strong enough capable leader. So he didn't feel this kind of insecurity that Ahmad ibn Zinke felt. So I personally cannot dismiss that fact from existence. And Saladin al Aobi, as we shall see, was also brought up in an environment somewhat similar to Nolidin Mahung's. So this might be one of the great differences between Amiruddin Zinke and between Amiruddin Zinke on one side and Amiruddin Mahmud and Solehad Din on the other.

The second aspect that I would think that we need also discuss is the fact that Amiruddin Mahmud made a treaty of friendship with the Eastern Romans in exchange for their retreat from the the region and in exchange for him aiding them against the Roman subjects. So from a real politics standpoint, I think that Nuh-uh, some some Roman sargent possessions in order to prevent an alliance between the French and the Eastern Romans that could undo all of his and his father's efforts before him was was a good decision to make. Why? Because later on in the in the in the resources, we would see that a truce would be made between Mordin Mahmud and the Roman subjects, and he would return all the possessions that he attacked to the Roman subjects. So I want to know if the speakers have any thoughts about this.

Yes. Yes. I've got Andre.

Yeah. I just want to follow-up on what you were saying about Ahmadine and his upbringing. I certainly agree that the political climate was was very different. And at the same time, Hamed Nadine the state that Hamed Nadine built was a lot more brittle than what Hamed Nadine had built. And that has a lot to do, again, with the PR efforts that he made that made ruling over these lands so easy.

But for me, I think the thing I noticed the most about Ahmadine is how destructive what was it called? I forgot. How destructive impulsiveness can be in the position of power. Because, for example, infamous massacre that had been committed was really nothing more than an emotional impulse. Right?

He was really frustrated with how long the siege took, and then he was like he told the soldiers, you know what? Go crazy. Do whatever you want. And even then, he realized he had like, what he did was wrong, and he had to reel them in. And subhanAllah, it was also his impulsiveness that led to his death when he screamed at that servant.

I wanna go a bit back to the earlier chapters with Faerus because I see a bit of a similarity here where the reason for treason was nothing malicious, really, other than the fact that they were humiliated and they were abused. And for them, that was a sufficient reason to betray their leader or their city. With it was the exact same thing. Right? He was humiliated.

He was insulted, and so he let the function to the city. The servant, he ended the So I I just found out very interesting.

Yes, madam. And do you have anything to add about the treaty between Nur ad Din Mahmud and the Eastern Romans?

Yeah. It's very pragmatic. He understood that he cannot face a war on two fronts. And like you said, rather, he inherited that from his father. And it was the reason that he did not pursue Antioch, for example, because he he did not want a Byzantine intervention.

And that sort of mirrors what our rulers are trying to do today, and that is trying to dismantle and disarm Zionism without any actions that would invite a regional war or an all out war with foreign elements?

Yeah. I mean, Austal did somewhat, you have an argument that was an interesting argument, likening the Eastern Roman Empire with the a national OCGSC of our time. So that meant that Nur ad Din Muhammad understood that this was the most important key player in the region and that they had to be neutralized as a threat from the region by means of, you know, being their friends and trying to handle them separately and making sure that they would never have interests that align with the interests of the Farang. That was the only sane policy in order to like, ad Din Mahmoud would say that I'm responsible solely now for expanding the Farang from the from the region, right, from the. So in order to achieve that goal, I might need to make some concessions on a Muslim front elsewhere.

How how much those concessions were, how deep those concessions were, is is a matter of of discussion. Right? And we see that the Muslim sources don't mention the condition because probably either the the the close ones to the the people close to Nur ad Din Mahmud in his court knew that some, a condition like that was was going to was maybe going to anger, the population because they would see it as a treason or or whatnot. But we see that the condition was mentioned in the Eastern Roman sources, and it was substantiated by him attacking some Roman subject possessions. But the reason why the populations didn't get angered by this, attack is that they were already used to that.

So as I mentioned, Noredi Mahmud had been on an on and off relationship with the Roman subjects, sometimes allying, sometimes attacking, and the Articles, as well in the North. So this northern front was always a matter of, what would you say? It was an agitating point between all three parties, the Articles, Nur ad Din Mahmud, representing the the Zangets, I mean, and the Roman subjects. So they weren't always aligned as to how they would manage the relationships between themselves. And if Nur ad Din Mahmud had to make some concessions, attacking against some possessions of the Roman subjects, he wasn't taking cities, and, certainly, he wasn't, you know, enslaving populations or any of that.

He was just attacking some possessions to relieve the Roman, the Eastern Roman, emperor from the heavy Roman subject attacks on their realm. And the the the final outcome was that the B'ilad Shem or the Levant was completely free of the Eastern Roman intervention. So I think it was a policy that especially that, again, a a treaty was concluded between Nur ad Din Mahmud and the Roman subjects returning to the Roman subjects the possessions. So, yeah, the Roman subjects, it wasn't a a lose lose on on all, you know, on all sides. No.

They they all they lost some cities at the time, some possessions at the time, but they were returned later on. So, I think that it was, in the end, in the final outcome, a successful policy. Although, it might have angered even some elements in court. I can imagine people screaming that this is not what you advocated for and that Muslims shouldn't be fighting Muslims, and this is not your policy, and this is not your PR campaign. But on the longer term, it was successful because the as long as the Eastern Romans were not involved in the region, the both, Nur ad Din Mahmud and, Sohad Din Ayubi, after him, were able to freely conduct their campaigns without fearing of intervention, as long as they don't attack Antioch directly.

So, yeah, I think it was a it was a good choice to make, even though it it might anger some people here. Alright. So if none of the speakers have anything brother Kareem, do you have anything to add? I haven't heard you this this this time around. Brother.

I'm thinking I like, you covered it all, to be honest. I don't think I have much to add. Just interesting, like, when you stated, let's say, Fudin was, you know, like, in charge of Mosul. Right? People need to understand that there was a caliphate at that time.

I think that's an interesting fact. Right? So even though you had a caliphate, it doesn't mean anything. Right? So I think that's an interesting thing to note that even though there was a caliphate and everything, still someone else was in charge, basically.

Right? And someone even, like, knew on the scene. Right? It wasn't someone who had some long term presence or very known to the people and so on, but still he took charge of that city. You know, like, even though we might have or something, it doesn't mean that someone else will not be in control.

Right? So I think that's an interesting thing to highlight. I also like the tactic of, you know, targeting the population that he went a bit different on it. That's something that stood out to me, his approach. And, again, it's about the context.

Right? It's like, when we look at this story, you have to understand that it's a very dynamic thing. Like because even now, if you look thirty years back, the things that our leaders could have done or couldn't have done completely changed, you know, compared to where we are today and what they you know, the space that they have to exert their influence and their policies. And I they had to build it brick by brick. Right?

It took time. So the approach that their father took, we cannot compare it, like, directly. We always have to look at all of the circumstances at all of the possible powers that the Muslims might have had at that time. And, you know, it's, like, ten years, fifteen years or something. And I believe in that time, it was, like, fast moving.

You know? Like, we always view history that the changes came every hundred, two hundred years or something. Right? Because it's, for us, very hard to imagine, like, year on year changes or something. But I do believe it's always been the same.

Right? That we need to think Just as I'm saying, like because, you know, the author or even, like, the or the historian. Right? Or I don't know if it was a. He was mentioning, Craig, that how virtuous his, you know, the son was and so on and the differences between the father and the son.

Yeah. I I agree with that. But, again, like, the things that did at his time, at his circumstances, what was going on, what was the vibe, you know, or the setting. I do believe he had very a bit different like, the approach that he took at his time was the approach that worked best for the intended purpose. Of course, there might have been some injustices caused.

I'm not saying that he was the same for anything. But due to his father's actions, Norejin was able to do what he did later on. Right? And the same thing, like, when Zahidin comes, he will be able to do what he did because did what he did. Right?

So it's always very dependent on what the previous one did and the situation that they are in. Right? So their actions cannot be compared too much because it's all evolving. It's all, you know, based on what has proceeded. Like, they are not all at the same time to be able to compare, you know, the approaches.

So, yeah, that's something that we need to keep in mind and that I try to keep in mind when I'm reading this. And the same, you know, like, when we look back even, you know, fifty years before with or with or all of these people that we discussed. Right? All of them were in different context kinda. Right?

Different situations, different part of, you know, different phase of the development. Right? And so, yeah, like, when we look now back what happened, you know, twenty years in our region. Right? What what happens now, what happened ten years ago, what will happen after ten years, it will be for each leader, like, we will not be able to compare them because everyone was in a completely different setting, and we see how fast it's moving now, right, or how we are aware of the changes that are occurring.

So someone will come, you know, after ten years or I don't know. After how long there will be a new leader in Saudi Arabia, he will have very different steps than what, you know, the father of Bensalman did. Right? So, yeah, I just think that this is something that we need to keep in mind when looking at these people and their steps and, you know, just understand that it's very dynamic, you know, and the situation is rapidly evolving. So that's my 2¢.

Well said, brother Karim, I think we can summarize your your talk in the fact that it's a continuum. And the bricks are being put one man at a time, one brick at a time. May have made some errors of judgment. May he he thought that this was the appropriate, you know, decision to take at the time. And in the end, he will be asked upon, you know, about his intentions and about his and Allah is the one who is Allah is he's the the most fair, and he will you know, he knows what had at heart as in as his his intentions at heart, what what they were, and he will, you you know, judge them accordingly.

But what matters is that the dunya affairs, the dunya conditions that Aymar al Din left Zanki left for his son were pursued, and they made Nur ad Din Muhammad's mission that much easier. And they made Salahid bin al Ayyubi's mission after Neridin Neridin Mahmud that much easier. So this continuum, this, you know, consequentiality, let's say, we cannot dismiss it, of course, and we always have to put that in mind. Like, always we have to put in mind the long the long game. And this is something that many of of of our generation is not, you know, taking into consideration.

You know, the long game is not taken into consideration. Like, after ten years, fifteen years, twenty years, how will it be? Those politicians that we have today, those Muslim rulers that we have today and back then, they have a vision in their minds. Maybe they make some wrong choices, maybe they make take some wrong decisions, maybe. No no one in this Mass room, no one is, you know, non erroneous except for Rasulullah But what we are saying is that the vision itself might be good, and they might have, you know, a decent goal in mind with some personal interest in mind that doesn't, you know, there's no conflict between the two.

But we have to wait and see. That's why we here now, after a millennium from those events, are able to say that Mordidin Muhammad did have a an actually long term decent goal and that his father before him did have a long term decent goal and that Sohad Din did have a long term decent goal and that they were able to do some of the most, you know, successful revivals of the Muslim in their time. Brother Karim raised his hand first, so he'll go, and then you brother Hadif inshallah.

Yeah. I just wanted to add, you know, because, like, when you were speaking of the OCGFC and so on or like that was just Sharith had this point. Again, it's about the circumstance. Right? Like, especially, like, last time we spoke about, you know, the change in the French, right, that we're living there.

You know, this is something that one needs to take into consideration, like, with the previous rulers. The structure of the population of the external enemy was different. The same, like, we have to think about the approach of the population living there. Right? How were they dissatisfied?

Right? The changes also. Like, you know, there are so many changes happening over the fifty years. The yeah. Again, like, it's another fact.

It's not just about, you know, what the rulers did themselves and discontinuing, but about the external factors changing and having come like, the same thing that Anatolina would have done, you know, fifty years earlier would have completely different effect than what he did now. Right? Or, like, the effect that it had when he did it now or it would have after fifty years. Right? So, like, even the same actions have different implications in different periods.

Right? So I think that's also something that needs to be taken into consideration. The like, three things. Right? The mood of the population, the population living there, the structure of the foreign population, and thirdly, even the approach of the, you know, contemporary other rulers.

Right? How they felt about the situation, how they like, how their approach to the situation evolved. Right? All of this plays into different effects and different implications of the same steps. Alright?

So even though like, for if our rulers, you know, did what they did now twenty years ago, they might have been, you know, subjected to some death enslavement and whatnot. Right? But if they do it now, suddenly you see, like, it's becoming the economic center. You know? Like, subhanAllah.

And it might have been the exact same policies, exact same steps, but the context changed. Right? The situation changes the yeah. So that's just something that I wanted to add to that point.

Absolutely, brother Kareem. And before I give the mic to brother Haddaika, I just want to add something. One of the most brilliant strategies pursued both by Nourid al Mahmud and by Salahdin at Ayawi, I think, is that they were able to make a pitch to the other Muslim rulers, completely under their control, that being on my side and and being on the side of the Muslim ummah as a whole in in the face of the fairens could be useful to you. Right? Because, again, like Ustadt Sheikh said at the beginning of the of the of the of the book discussion of this book discussion and the beginning of the sessions, these are not Malaika.

Right? Those men in power are not Malaika. Not all of them are Malaika. Right? They are normal people with normal aspirations, like most of us, or many of us, or all of us.

Right? And this meant that real politic was a very strong element in their thinking process. Right? The aspiration to power, the aspiration to preserve my domain, my city, my rule, blah blah blah. Right?

So when someone as righteous and as fair and as, good natured as Nur ad Din Mahmud or Sohad Din Ayubi or Ahmad Din Zinke, one of their strongest points of strength is that they were able to make the pitch to the Muslim rulers to convince them that if you join me, there are gains to be made on the ground. They're not they're not talking about the right now. They're not talking about paradise and hell and and. They're not talking about that. No.

They're talking about worldly affairs. If you join me in my campaign against the French, there are spoils to be made. Your population will love you, and you will still remain ruler of your city. So what do you have to lose? Right?

So this bid, right, this pitch, this selling point, this is the strongest point that both Noredin Mahmud and Sahin al Aiyubi, they were brilliant strategists in that aspect. They were brilliant. They were able to put it to to to to great effect because they didn't have to fight that many wars against Muslim force. They had to fight sometimes Muslim foes, but not that much, not like Amradi Dzenke, for example. Of course, the situation was different in Bab El Lohan.

We we we made that point clear enough. But I'm talking about how the their their convincing powers, their persuasion powers, they were they were role models in that aspect, I think. And so this is something that we need to capitalize and learn from those two men, is that you have to convince people to help you in worldly matter in worldly terms, in in in worldly matters terms. Right? You have to convince them that they have gains to be made if they follow you, if they join you in your campaign against the enemies of their own.

So that's a point I think, is is worth mentioning. AS, brother Halifa, over to you.

Yeah. Brilliant points from both you and and brother Karim. And I think that's very astute, and I I really appreciate that sort of framing as well. It helps, I think, to even read current events. And just I just one thing that I wanted to to note, it's a just light foreshadowing, no spoilers, but you mentioned how they they saw this sort of long game.

And I think sometimes we have a fantastical notion because of propagandized and really filtered accounts of Salahdin and Ayyubi, but we will see very much the same thing with him as well. There is definitely a long game that he played as well with a long term vision both in the during his rule and for what came after it. And just something that I wanted to sort of pin, and inshallah, we come back to that, and we can expand upon that when we get to his his life and and and rule and leadership as well.

Yeah. Absolutely, brother Harif. And I think that we may this is as as said, and as I said at the beginning of the of the book discussion when we first started, we're not we're not, you relating tales here. We're trying to make the most benefit from from those stories that we tell. And maybe a point worth mentioning and something that we might ask people to do and, you know, to to reflect upon, and even the rulers, you never know who might be listening, is that PR is a very strong element.

We need to focus on PR very much. Our enemies use PR to a great extent. They are weaponizing PR to a point that the populations sometimes are unaware of the situation on the ground. They're unaware of what's happening. And although the the rulers of the Muslims are actually working consciously to to try to elevate the situation and to try to change the situation on the ground, the the the the absence of PR on their side can be catastrophic.

So maybe one of the the the things that we as Muslims need to work upon both in the civilian population and the the rulers. We have to have a very strong PR apparatus that is able to to work. Like, if they have a fraction of of Nur ad Din and Solejin's Mahmud's strength in the PR aspect, the situation would be extremely different from what it is right now, Like, in terms of people not seeing that the rulers are doing anything and that they are thinking that the rulers are, you know, being submissive and all of that. No. If the PR campaigns and the PR apparatus of the Muslim Ummah are as strong as Nuh-uh Muhammad Ayubis, we would be living in a totally different situation in terms of, you know, consciousness of the situations, of the steps being made on the ground and how how how, the scholars and the Muslim clerics are actually mobilizing the masses in in in tandem with the rulers to to to have a unified front against the enemies of the Ummah.

So PR is is something not to be missed. And the stronger PR apparatus you have, the greater power you have against your foes against your foes, against the enemies of the Ummun. Because they are using PR ruthlessly against the Muslim populations, and sometimes they use it in order to make the Muslim populations rise against the rulers, which makes that, the the mission of the rulers in the in the region not much harder because they have to face two fronts, the the populations on the inside and the enemies on the outside. So, yes, brother Abdurrahman.

Yes, Brother Andrejme. Just to follow-up on great points raised by the brothers and sisters. I think PR is extremely important, of course, but as Noradim demonstrated. But at the same time, when looking at the situation today, it is obviously much harder to project such an image simply because the problems in the region are so much more complex. And the threat and the dangers and the risks are also on a much, much higher magnitude.

Back then, during the time of Norreddin, his greatest threat was the Eastern Romans. If he could just neutralize that threat, then he can focus solely on the goal, the main goal, which is the French in Bladesheim. And we even saw a de facto alliance where they teamed up against the Sultanate of Rome against Caligar Salan. So even then, as you said, this could be seen as a contradiction. Like, how are you allying allying with the eastern Romans and fighting the the Muslims?

But, again, this we need to look at the strategic necessity of this. And today, of course, because situation is much more difficult, then concessions are going to have to be much, much greater. That, Okay, our rulers today understand that Zionism is a threat that cannot be dismantled militarily. So we're going to have to pursue every other option we can. And it's not going to look nice.

It's not going to look pretty. And it's going to the optics of it not going to be that great. And it's really out of necessity. My point is basically that the PR was much, much easier to do back then than it is today because Nouridine could actually project an image of power, not just an image of righteousness and piousness. But he present himself as the solution to the calamity that had occupied the blood of Shem.

Today, it is much more difficult to project this image of this uncompromising leader, this virtuous leader who doesn't make any compromise, doesn't make any mistakes, solely dedicated to the cause, is solely dedicated to Islam, etcetera, etcetera. There are going be, as we're seeing, great concessions. But again, these concessions in how long but on a long enough time frame, we will see not only the necessity, but also the benefit and how how strategic it was in hindsight, inshallah, as we are doing today, inshallah.

InshaAllah, brother Akhman. Yes, brother Karim? Please.

For your No. No. No. I'm really happy extending this.

You you guys haven't talked in a lot in a in a while. So really happy we're discussing those points because this is an important chapter in the book, and I think a lot a lot of points are are worth discussing. So please.

Yeah. And especially the points raised by brothers and sisters. What you mentioned, you know, with them being able to somehow know what the other leaders want, right, and play on that part. Like, the brilliance that I can see is, you know, as a leader, you need to know all of the players involved, all of the actors. Right?

And it's something that, know, mentioned in his relative power index lectures where, like, to make correct assessments or correct decisions, you need to know who is active. Right? Who is on the scene, basically. So, you know, at that time, you had exactly the French occupation, the newcomers. You had the people that were already there.

You have your populations. You have different I thought it's different rulers of different parts of the the. Right? Like, you have the sultanate of or the Byzantine. Like, you have all of these actors, and all of them want a bit something different, right, and have different goals.

And you need to somehow manage to persuade all of these players, right, in some sense. And it's very similar now. Right? Like, you have the OCGFC. You have the neocons.

You have Trump and his family. You have BRICS partners. You have Europe populations. You have, you know, diaspora who's just constantly making up stuff about you. Right?

Like, you have all of these parties, and you need to somehow, like because when you do the PR, like, who are you trying to convince? Right? This is something like because with the PR, if we you know, when you spoke about it, like, there's also some image you're trying to present about the one image that you will present will maybe make one party happy, but will make two other parties, you know, angry with you. Right? So it's it's also very important how you balance your image and how you and, again, you know, like, with our leaders today, like, when you mentioned that he figured out how to somehow motivate the leaders of other parts of Syria and so on to join the cause.

Like, look what our leaders are doing now to motivate the OCGFC to join the regional plan. Right? Very similar instance. Right? Because, again, you I don't know.

At that time, maybe it more about land or something, but in the end, it's always about somehow profits. Right? And it's the same now. Like, these guys, again, you know, all they want in the region is profit. Right?

The same that the French wanted, French. Right? But, of course, with them, it was a bit different. Like, these guys nowadays in the suits. But they're the same people.

Right? That's what we spoke about in the first sections. Right? But they have the same goals in our regions. And I think the and and maybe later on, even, like, from what I remember couple of instances, they this diplomatical approach and trying to figure out the leverage that you have over each player and what each player wants and trying to somehow navigate through that very important aspect that I think that previous leaders might have not you know, they were built in this sense of, like, if I have a problem, we will fight it out and so on.

And it didn't always the intended, you know, benefit or the it didn't reach the goal. Right? The friends were still there. But as we will see now with these guys and subhanAllah, like, their approach shifts. Right?

They try to play this propaganda aspect, this diplomatic negotiations aspect. Right? And exactly what we are seeing with our leaders. Right? SubhanAllah.

Like, you cannot, you know, defeat these players militarily. It will just lead to ruin in your lands. Of course, back then, maybe they would have probably defeated the French militarily, but we can see that the diplomatic approach and the PR approach and the propaganda approach and the manipulating the sites and trying to see who each party wants and how to gain into our side was much more prosperous and much more, you know, correct in the in terms of reaching the desired goal. Right? So that's something that when you were speaking about, it just came to my mind, and I thought it was very interesting.

Yeah. And the comparison to today. Right? Like, trying to see because, you know, you have these different factions. You have the militant factions.

You have the, you know, OCGFC. There is a big looming factor, you know, coming to your region. You have all of these players, and each of them wants to reach their goal in some different manner. Right? And how can you, as some player with influence, get them all on your side?

Right? It's not just about the rulers, like, in in your surroundings, right, to try to get Turkey and try to get Egypt and try to get, I don't know what, on your side to to be, you know, on the same vision of The Gulf, but now trying to even get the external players on your side. Alright? Trying to make them like, hey. If we prosper, it's gonna be better for you.

Right? Right? Yeah. So that's something that's very interesting.

Yeah. Absolutely. Absolutely, brother Karim. Very well said. Very well put.

The the consolidation of goals. Right? So this is the brilliance, is that you are able to see people with different interests and trying to to maximise the commonalities between between those interests in such a way as to make every everyone think that they're going to win if if if a certain policy is followed or a certain decision is made. So that no one is so that it's not a a zero sum game. Right?

No. It's a it's an old win situation. So I think this is the this is what differs a politician from a from a layman. Right? And this is what differs a strong politician from a weak politician.

And we hope that our Rumah is going to be on the rise, in that better days, even if we, as a generation, don't live to see those better days that our sons and grandsons and their grandsons after them will live in better days. And we hope that these discussions, they will listen to and they will remember and say that our grandfathers were somehow hopeful of the future. And we now see the fruits of their discussions and the rulers of their time, and we are now living in better times because they had the foresight. And you never know. So if any of the speakers have anything more to add, I would be more than happy.

Please, guys, this is a great session so far. So if you if any of the speakers has anything to add. Carlos, our listeners, we are discussing the book, The Crusades Through Arab Eyes by Amin Malouf. You can find it in the book discussion group of Middle Nation. Do enter the group.

Do read the book, and you will have great benefit inshallah. We discuss the group we discuss the book every other Saturday. So both the speakers and the listeners have time to reflect upon the points mentioned and the points discussed. And I guess we will see you all in the next chapter, Insha'Allah. I hope that we will be able to discuss it before Ramadan.