Iran Is Smarter Than You Think (Part One)

There are some topics. There's a number of topics, really, that you you're you're you're simply not allowed to talk about honestly. You're not allowed to talk about them objectively. I don't mean that they're so dangerous or that they're so risky that you can't talk about it because the powers that be will clamp down on you and what have you. That's not what I mean.

Those those types of topics exist, surely, but that's not what I mean. I'm talking about topics that are so thoroughly embedded in narratives. Narratives that very large swaths of the population are invested in invested in deeply that you cannot talk about these topics in any way whatsoever unless it aligns with this or that narrative. They they can't hear you unless it conform conforms with some sort of a narrative. And even if you don't align with one or another narrative about the topic, you will inevitably you unilaterally be assigned one or other of the narrative camps by by either side of the people.

You know? If you if you don't align with the narrative that they are invested in, then they will identify you as someone who is supporting the preexisting counter narrative that they're opposed to. This is inescapable. It's inescapable. So whenever you try to talk about any of these topics, if you've decided to go ahead and talk about one of these topics, then you are already accepting that you will be misunderstood, you will be misconstrued, you will be misrepresented, and most likely you will be maligned.

And even if the misunderstanding is not negative, you may end up getting inadvertently adopted by this or that narrative camp because they're doing the same thing. They do the same thing. But instead of assigning you the, the negative camp, the the camp that they do not belong to, they will assign you membership to the camp that they do belong to. You understand me? So Iran is a topic like this.

Iran is definitely a topic like this. It's impossible to talk about Iran objectively, or rather, it's impossible for you to be heard. It's impossible for for objective discussion of Iran to be heard by most people, either the the side that is pro Iran or the side that is anti Iran. The pro side will take anything that you say about Iran that is less than Iran is a brave and heroic nation that is defined as Zionist imperialist powers. If you say anything less than that, then you will be deemed a western hater.

Or if you are Muslim, then you will be deemed a sectarian hater of the Shia. And then the the anti Iran side, they will most likely either think that you are pro Iran if you're being objective. And then they'll hate you for not demonizing Iran from top to bottom, which is what they require. Or they will assume that you are demonizing Iran when you don't call it the brave, valiant, wonderful nation. And then they'll use your remarks to lash out against it on in your in your, comments section.

Now I'm not explaining all of this. I'm not, making this disclaimer because I want to be or or I'm afraid of being misunderstood or I'm afraid of being misrepresented or what have you. I'm not worried about trolls in the comment section. I'm perfectly used to that. That's fine.

I'm saying this because you, whoever you are in this camp or that camp, you need to try to comprehend the fact that willful refusal to understand something makes you irrelevant. It makes you irrelevant. It makes you irrelevant to any serious discussion around the topic that you are determined to willfully not understand. I really hope you can grasp this. I hope you can comprehend this for your own sake.

Narrative is not for serious people. Narrative is for people who have already accepted to be compliantly manipulated by others. And when you aggressively defend the narratives that you believe in, the narratives that you believe in, You're defending your own categorization as an unthinking pliable tool. So I'm saying this is bad for you. I'm saying it's bad for you, and I'm saying that you shouldn't be satisfied with that for yourself for yourself.

So let me begin talking about Iran by saying that first of all, in my opinion, Iran is one of the most savvy political players in the region. If not the most savvy political player and they have been for almost fifty years. The lowest ranking Iranian diplomat, the lowest ranking Iranian diplomat could run circles around the highest level western counterpart, diplomatic counterpart. They're incredibly smart. They're incredibly smart and incredibly cunning people.

I personally have enormous respect for their political acumen. And when I talk about, for example, Iran coordinating with The United States, coordinating with Israelis, I'm not saying that to denigrate them. You think I am, but I'm not. This is an element of their phenomenal political savvy. And the fact also that they have been so successful in crafting a narrative about themselves that makes so many people think that this type of coordination is unthinkable.

This is also part of their savvy, that you think it's impossible that that this coordination is happening. Even while the coordination is literally published, you can see it, you can read about it, it's not secret. But the narrative that they crafted is so powerful that people never even register. You never even register what is openly and blatantly coordination. That's incredibly powerful narrative control.

Not to mention, like I said before, the fact that so many people believe that Iran is the only one who ever helped Gaza. They're only they're they're the only ones who ever helped the Palestinians. That they're the only ones standing up for Palestine and what have you. When, factually, this is not accurate whatsoever. This is not accurate at all.

That's incredible narrative control, and I'm not saying that as a criticism. I mean, you literally have millions of people believing believing in something, believing in a story that is almost not connected to reality at all. I know that'll trigger you that'll trigger you, but I'm not saying it as an insult at all. This is evidence of Iran's brilliance, political brilliance. This is how I see it.

I mean, the actual facts are not controversial. It's not contestable, but they're rejected outright because of the power of the narrative that Iran constructed about themselves. I mean, that Iran via their proxies killed approximately half a million Muslims. Half a million Muslims they killed in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Yemen, And yet they're still touted as the bulwarks of Islam. While The UAE, for example, is labeled genocidal for the actions of the RSF in Sudan, which caused a fraction of the number of victims that Iran has caused.

So in other words, you can openly, actively, aggressively create, arm, fund, and train regimes and groups, organizations, militias, mass murdering Muslims in Be'lat Hashem and in Yemen, and you still get to be the hero in the public mind, in the public imagination. But if you take sides with the RSF, which you did not create, you are 100% responsible for the RSF's crimes and atrocities, and you should be boycotted, and you should be despised, and you're a hypocrite, and you you you you're a traitor to Islam. That's extremely effective, extremely powerful narrative control that Iran has. You can fund Hamas, right, when they are strictly a fighting force and then completely drop them when they become the government of Gaza. You can drop them when when Qatar becomes their primary financier for the last decade and a half, but you still get credited with being the only nation supporting the Palestinians.

This is a propaganda coup. I'm not I'm not saying it to denigrate them. This is just the facts. It's quite an accomplishment. You're able to actually maintain the impression that you are just on the verge of destroying Israel for the last forty five years without ever even shooting so much as an arrow at Israel the whole time right up until last year.

And everyone believes you. Everyone believes that you're a big threat and a big danger. And you can literally coordinate with The United States. You can coordinate with Israel about air strikes, what you will strike, what you will target, when you will hit, and so forth. And you can inform The United States ahead of time that you're gonna strike their air base in Qatar.

You can give them all this information. You can have discussions where The US proposes to you striking your territory and orchestrating exactly how that's gonna play out with everyone understanding the choreography, everyone involved, all the players understanding, and that can be published and it can be acknowledged in the media, in the press, by your own officials, and yet people still believe that there is no coordination when it's right in front of their faces. The propaganda narrative of Iran is one of the most outstanding in history. It's got to be one of the best examples ever. And I'm saying that the coordination, this coordination understand me.

I'm not criticizing. I'm not criticizing the coordination. The fact that there is this kind of coordination is again exactly the cunning and the savvy that I'm talking about with regards to Iran. I'll tell you, I don't think that the people who, you know, are unthinkingly pro Iran have even begun even begun to truly appreciate how masterful that government really is. And you get mad at me even though I do appreciate it.

I appreciate how masterful they are. You think I'm insulting Iran when I'm pointing out how much political genius they have displayed for decades. It's truly impressive if you were looking at it from a realpolitik geopolitical standpoint. And look, there's another thing. There's another thing that if you want to opine about politics, if you wanna talk about politics, if you wanna be involved in political discourse, geopolitical discourse, what have you, there's another thing that you're gonna have to wrap your head around.

You're gonna have to try to wrap your heads around this. Morality and ethics at the state level do not operate the way morality and ethics operates at the level of the individual, of you and I. You understand me? If you wanna apply moral and ethical judgments to Iran, to Saudi Arabia, to The UAE, to whoever else, to any state, and you're gonna do it the same way that you would apply it to an individual person, then they're all gonna look pretty bad. They're all gonna look bad.

But that would be irrational. That's not reasonable. That's not realistic. Like, you know, you think about that trolley problem. You know, the classic ethical puzzle, the trolley problem.

There's trolley coming down the tracks and there's one person is tied to one set of tracks, and there's three people or five people or something like this tied to another set of tracks. And you have a lever that you can pull, and if you pull that lever that's gonna decide which tracks the trolley goes down, that puzzle, that ethical problem. Okay. That ethical moral problem is for individuals. Now if you're gonna make a counterpart a counterpart problem of the trolley problem for a state, for a head of state, understand it's gonna be immeasurably more complex.

It's not like the trolley problem for the individual. There's a lot more at stake. There's a lot more at stake than the problem that's right there at hand. The the horizons are longer. The ramifications are more complicated.

What each lever can do is more complicated, and there's multiple levers. You understand me? And it's not a trolley that's coming down the track. It's an insurgency. It's an epidemic.

It's a military strike. It's a war. And it's not three people or five people on the tracks, it's millions. Or on the tracks, it's your national security. It's the viability of your regime.

It's a long term economic project. Or it's a nuclear program. Or it's your allies. Or it's your trade partners. Or it's your whole economy.

You understand? It's hundreds of thousands of jobs. It's a trade route, on and on. No matter what lever you pull, right, no matter what lever you pull, something is gonna be sacrificed. Something is gonna be sacrificed because something else takes priority.

You understand me? You have to sacrifice, ideologically. You have to sacrifice economically, militarily, geopolitically. Take your pick. You have to weigh domestic internal consequences and regional and global consequences to to to the pulling of those levers.

Like I say, economic consequences. And economic consequences, by the way, doesn't mean that you're making decisions based upon materialistic reasons or just for about money. You're making decisions about your economy. That means whether people will have food. That means whether people have jobs, whether they'll have any spending power, whether they'll have any kind of quality of life, whether your domestic industry will survive, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.

And you have to make these decisions every day. Every day. Sometimes several times a day. So, for example, as a Muslim, as a human being, obviously, as a Muslim and as a human being, as an individual, I will condemn Iran's killings in Syria, in Yemen, in Lebanon, in Iraq. And I will condemn the RSF atrocities in Sudan.

And I will condemn The UAE taking their side. But I can understand why those levers were pulled. You understand me? I can understand why Iran set up proxy militias like Hezbollah. I can understand why they supported the Houthis.

I can understand why they funded Hamas and then stopped funding Hamas. I can understand their actions. Doesn't mean I condone them, but I understand their actions because I understand the position that they were in. And I can understand the trolley problem that they were trying to solve. The trolley problem that they were facing, and I can understand the levers that they had to choose from.

And the lever of back channel coordination has always made sense for Iran. Just as the bombastic rhetoric and the creation of that narrative of of resistance, that resistance axis of resistance narrative, that made sense right alongside the coordination, the back channel coordination, particularly in a region that doesn't like your regime. Oh, they've played their politics beautifully. They've played their politics absolutely brilliantly given the situation that they have been in. And I believe that they are continuing to do exactly that.

I believe that's exactly what they're doing. They're they're reading the room. They have read the room, and Iran knows very well that the post World War two order is being dismantled. And they also know that the post World War two global order has been the whole context in which they have operated all this time. It's the only context in which the way they operated made sense.

And they know therefore that a change is necessary. A transition is necessary, but it's extremely treacherous. It's extremely, incredibly difficult and challenging to do. They have to adapt. They have to change their whole posture, their whole ethos, their whole regional strategy.

I don't think many people appreciate this, what they're up against. And this is what they're trying to do. This is what they're trying to do. I've already talked about this a few times, but it's the same thing that's going on, so this is kind of an update. Like, now you have two things that are going on simultaneously with regards to Iran.

You have this massive military buildup by the Americans in the Middle East, you know, fighter jets, aircraft carriers, and whatnot, as well as inside of Iran, we know that we have clear infiltration by The United States inside Iran to stir protests. And then on the other hand, that's on the one hand, then on the other hand, you have America and Iran engaging in negotiations in Geneva with both sides expressing optimism about how the talks are going. It seems like a paradox. So what what what exactly is actually going on here? Right?

You have to wonder. Well, in my opinion, is what I have said before and what I have said for quite some time. Iran is trying to change. Iran needs to integrate into the region as a partner, needs to integrate into the region as an ally, and it needs to be part of the regional plan, the regional plan that is more or less summed up by Saudi Vision 2030, their initiative. They're part of BRICS alongside UAE, alongside Egypt, alongside Russia, alongside China, and they're trying to be, for lack of a better word, they're trying to be normalized as a team player within the region.

And the challenge that they're facing is to try to facilitate that normalization within the region without sacrificing the regime that has been considered in the region for so long as antagonistic and hostile and sectarian and problematic. In other words, like I said before, probably a year ago or two years ago maybe, Iran needs to change their regime to avoid regime change. That's an immensely complicated thing to do, and it's extremely dangerous. And I don't think people appreciate that. And like I said back then, I personally, I dearly hope that they can do it.

I believe that they can do it, and I hope that they can do it. Precisely because they are truly brilliant in politics, I this is why I think that they can do it.

Because okay. Look at what's going on. Let's look at

what's going on. As of last week, The United States has deployed, I think, two full aircraft carrier strike groups to the region, the, USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Gerald Ford. These are the largest aircraft carriers in the world. More than a 120 combat, aircraft have been moved to bases American bases across The Middle East. You got the f sixteens, f fifteens, f 20 twos, and whatnot, surveillance planes, aerial refueling tankers and whatnot, cargo aircraft by the hundreds.

By every metric, this is one of the largest, if not the largest, concentration of American air power in The Middle East since the two thousand three invasion of Iraq. And again, now simultaneously with that, in Geneva, you have Iranian and American negotiators. They just concluded their second round of of talks mediated mediated by Oman, and both sides are describing the atmosphere as constructive. They have another round of talks that was just announced. It's gonna start, I think, on Thursday.

Iran's foreign minister says that they have agreed on guiding principles for a potential deal. Now they're in the process of drafting, the actual text for a sort of framework for an agreement. Trump himself said that he thinks that Iran wants to make a deal. Obviously, he wants to make a deal too. Now if you hold both these images in your mind at the same time, where you've got the American military deployment, the biggest in twenty years, and then on the other hand, you've got the diplomacy in Geneva with both sides describing progress, That that leaves most people wondering what's what which one is real?

Which one is the real pathway forward? Are we about to get into a big war? Is this gonna be World War three finally that we've been hearing about all this time? No. Both are real.

And there's no there's no contradiction. These are the same operation. These are both running on on two different tracks simultaneously for the same end, for the same reason, for the same purpose. And the purpose is not to for the for the US to put pressure on Iran militarily to try to force them into making a deal. And it's not about pretending to negotiate by The US, pretending to negotiate so that they can stall and build up their military forces for an invasion.

In order for either of those explanations to be plausible, you would need to overlook almost the entire actual history between The United States and Iran. That is not the way they work. Look at who's negotiating for Iran in Geneva. It's the foreign minister. The lead negotiator is Abbas Arafchi, Iran's foreign minister.

This is a very serious individual. This is a very serious man. He has a he has a profile of a hardliner. This is a military man. He served in the IRGC.

He fought in the Iran Iraq war. He was allegedly involved in covert ops with the Quds Force. This guy is about as establishment as you can get. This is not a reformist. This is not a reformist.

This is a man who is deeply, structurally embedded in the revolutionary security apparatus in Iran. But he is also the man who helped to craft the 2015 nuclear deal under Rouhani. So if you understand what I've been talking about, you'll you'll you'll recognize this is exactly the kind of person that you want. This is exactly the kind of person who can make this deal and have it actually survive within Iran domestically. This isn't a typical reformist.

Typical reformist could never make this deal. The hardliners would kill it. A technocrat with no revolutionary credentials can't make this deal. The IRGC would veto it. But a man who has the trust of Khamenei, he has IRGC credentials, he has western diplomatic experience, he's a veteran, so forth, This is someone who can negotiate concessions and sell them internally as pragmatic necessity rather than any sort of ideological surrender.

He can present a nuclear deal to the hardliners and have it not be taken as capitulation, but as a strategic maneuver to preserve the the system, preserve the revolution. I mean, is his own framing. This is his own framing. How he described his role is to manage the rivalry and avoid escalation. He called it heroic flexibility.

Take a look at that phrase, heroic flexibility. That's a masterwork of Iranian political communication. It tells the hardliners, we're not surrendering. We're maneuvering. We're being flexible in the way a hero is flexible.

It's heroic flexibility, strategic, not flexible out of weakness. We're the smart ones who know how to how how to pivot and when to pivot. And he's not wrong. That's what I'm telling you. He's not wrong.

And he's he's not alone either. Arakashi is not alone. You can look at the whole configuration of what you can say represents the pragmatists in Iran and who are sort of managing the transformation of Iran or trying to. The president, Pazeshkyan, who was elected in 2024 on the back of reformist support. He had support from reformist after the death of Raisi.

But in fact, he himself is not a reformist. He's not a reformist president. Not the way anyway, he's not he's not a reformist in the way that the western media conceptualize reformist. He's a chosen instrument of Khamenei. He said it himself before his election that he would follow whatever Khamenei told him.

Whatever whatever Khamenei's directives were, he would do it. His whole cabinet was assembled with Khamenei's explicit approval, including having him give, you know, intelligence, justice, interior ministries, and so forth over to the hardliners and to IRGC IRGC aligned figures. This is not a reformist government. It's not reformist, and that's important. It's a cross factional managed transition government, in my opinion, that was put together by the so called supreme leader himself in order to execute the transformation that everyone understands is necessary, but while maintaining enough hardline presence to keep the IRGC from prevailing and rejecting it.

Because like I said, this is incredibly tricky. And then you have Mohammed Javad Zarif, who's in the background. He's the intellectual godfather of the Pachman School, you can see. He was the one who built the original nuclear deal playbook. He supported Pazeshkyan's election, and now he serves in an advisory capacity to Pazeshkyan.

He's the strategic mind, in my opinion, whose framework Araghchi is now executing in the diplomatic negotiations. And then finally, have Ali Shamkhani, and he's one of the most interesting figures for understanding what's actually happening in Iran right now, in my opinion. Shamkhani is a war veteran. Again, He's a former IRGC commander. And just this month in February, he was appointed the secretary of the defense council.

Now mainstream analysis would read his appointment as Iran preparing for war. But in my opinion, I I see it completely differently. In my opinion, this is this is you're putting a man who has maximum IRGC credibility at the the defense apparatus, in charge of the defense apparatus precisely when you need the IRGC to not mutiny while at the same time your pragmatist diplomats are trying to finalize a deal. This tells the hardliners in the language that they can understand. I'm one of you.

I have the scars to prove it. And I'm telling you that this is the path forward. This is the path that we need to take. Heroic flexibility. See, like I said before, this is very much like what's going on in The United States itself with the neocons.

They have to they have to try to placate the neocons, try to placate the nationalistic faction of the OCGFC with the America first rhetoric and so forth, dismantling American empire while advertising it like you're solidifying American empire, making America great again and what have you. And the, you know, the Christian Zionists and so forth. So in Iran, this is sort of the pragmatist camp, these people that I mentioned. They're not reformists. They're not liberals.

These are what you can call revolutionary insiders who have correctly concluded that the system can only survive through transformation. And they have the credentials, the hardline credentials, to execute that transformation without triggering a coup from within. Because like I said, this is incredibly perilous what they're trying to do. Now in the aftermath of the, protests in January, like I said before, I think that those protests were real. They're rooted in real genuine economic catastrophe in Iran.

Inflation is, like, 42%. Food prices up 72%. The currency is in free fall. So after those protests, the IRGC launched the biggest purge of reformist figures since 2009. The head of the reformist front, Azar Mansouri, the head of the political committee, Ebrahim Azarzadeh, the former deputy foreign minister, Mohsen Aminzadeh, and multiple other senior reformist figures.

Many were arrested. Many were arrested. Charged with undermining national unity. Charged with coordinating with enemy propaganda. Okay?

So now this looks like apparently, this looks like the hardliners circling the wagons. Right? It looks like they're digging their heels in. But in my opinion, what this is is the the the the reformers overplayed their hand. They overplayed their hand.

They were calling for an independent investigation into the deaths that resulted from the protests. I think the official told us around 3,000. Other estimates say that it's more, but who knows? They proposed the formation of a national assembly, assembly to try to help steer the country out of crisis. Okay?

They jumped the shark. The reformers were threatening to destabilize what is supposed to be a managed transformation. They were too visible. They were too vocal. You understand me?

Therefore, that made them potentially too useful of a vehicle for foreign interference. This reminds me of when, women in Saudi Arabia, back several years ago, they did that protest driving driving in the early days of Mohammed bin Salman's authority. He promised reforms. He promised changes. He promised that he was gonna rescind the ban on women driving, but they pushed anyway.

They didn't wanna wait. They they weren't patient. And so they drove and they protested and they got clamped down upon. They got arrested. And then the reforms proceeded without looking like the the reforms were being put in place because the government was pressured to do it.

So most likely, in my opinion, the IRGC removed these people, these reformist figures, in my opinion, not to try to stop the transformation that they were advocating Because the deal making apparatus is is there of Arakuchi, Pazeshkyan, and Shamkhani. This was all left completely intact and operational. These are the pragmatists. They're there. But they had to remove them to ensure that the transformation happens on the system's terms.

On the system's terms. Not on the terms of street protesters. Not on the terms of western backed opposition. You understand me? The pragmatists are managing the deal.

It's very important that they're the ones managing it. The IRGC is managing the domestic space, and they're not in conflict with each other about this. They're running coordinated lanes of the of the same operation. But the IRGC and the hardliners, they might not all understand what the endgame is, so you don't wanna trigger them. So in my opinion, the reformists who got arrested, that that's collateral damage.

Not because anyone hated them or disagreed with them necessarily, but because they became a liability. They were trying to turn the controlled demolition into an uncontrolled demolition. Okay? So now let's talk about the talks themselves in Geneva because there is a detail in the in the the Geneva negotiations that I think is the single most important data point in the entire story, and it's being completely ignored or almost completely ignored. Trump and his team have been very public publicly, loudly, repeatedly insisting that their red line is zero enrichment for Iran.

Iran has completely abandoned its uranium enrichment program. They've said this publicly many times. This has been stated as nonnegotiable on the part of the Trump administration. This is what Trump's team told the world. And then Iran's foreign minister, Araqi, went on American television after the Geneva talks and said, The United States Of America has not asked for zero enrichment.

This is theater. The the man who's sitting across the table from the Americans says that the Americans are not actually demanding what the Americans publicly said they were demanding, and he says it on American television. Okay? This is the fifty year formula playing out in real time, right in front of your face. There's the there's the performance for the audience, but the negotiation, that's the reality.

That's the reality. Trump performs his aggression for his base, for the Zionists, for the neocon faction and so forth, for the military industrial complex. Khamenei performs his defiance for the hardliners. And in Geneva, the pragmatists actually work out the actual terms. Now what Iran has reportedly offered in Geneva, what their offer is, Iran's offer, is to suspend enrichment for three to five years and to eliminate the stockpile of already highly enriched uranium, most of which, frankly, has probably already been degraded anyway, or its location is unknown after the the strikes in June by The United States in 2025.

And what America has reportedly offered is not zero enrichment, but limited enrichment under strict monitoring. There's even back channel discussions about the possibility of Iranian uranium being processed elsewhere externally, that their uranium could go to Russia or to to Turkey. You know, Iran keeps the right to enrich uranium on paper, but the physical material leaves the country and is done elsewhere. This is a deal. This is this is the architecture already there for a deal.

That already exists. So the only question now is timing. Timing and domestic political management on both sides in America and in Iran. Now I've said several times that in my opinion, Iran is making decisions, is only making decisions while consulting with BRICS and consulting with the GCC, and I think that that's still the case because the Gulf States are doing a lot more than than than anyone in the Western media gives them credit for or reports about. What they're doing is absolutely essential to understanding how this is gonna end, which would which way this is gonna go.

Start with Saudi Arabia because Saudi Arabia is the key player here. Any everyone knows. Saudi Arabia is the the, you know, the leader of the of the vision, 2030, and so forth. And bin Salman has made several things very clear. He personally called Pazesh Qian and told him publicly that Saudi Arabia is not going to allow their airspace to be used or their airspace or their territory to be used for any military action against Iran from any party regardless of the origin.

Ben Salman has been lobbying the Trump administration directly directly and aggressively to refrain from striking Iran. And, of course, you've got the Saudis and the and the Qataris and the Egyptians even telling Washington that they're concerned about Iranian retaliation against their own territory, against their own infrastructure if The US gets struck. But think about Saudi Arabia for a minute. Reflect on Saudi Arabia, trying to say don't strike Iran. This is a country that for decades was considered to be Iran's primary regional adversary.

This is the country whose oil facilities were hit by Iranian strikes in 2019. This is a country who was what was at war with Iran's proxy, the Houthis, for years and years and years. Now Saudi Arabia is publicly trying to protect Iran from American military action. Why? Because Mohammed bin Salman understands something that the people who are screaming about war and who are so worried about war and the outbreak of World War three and what have you, he understands something that they don't.